Introduction
argue that in studying networks, academics focus on the volume of relationships and the outputs created by those links. They call for increased attention to the nature of relationships within networks. This paper focuses on these relationships, using postKatrina New Orleans as context for a series of case studies on neighborhood associations and their networks. 1 In doing so, it radically transforms and redefines the typical conception of such relationships, moving beyond configurations such as Brown and Keast's (2003) categorization of relationships as being collaborative, cooperative or coordinative. Brown and Keast's classifications, and the broader literature on which they are built, fundamentally envision networks as working together. An in-depth look at policy networks in New Orleans shows that this is not the case. Conflict is a key feature of networks, and conflict is a reaction to being excluded from them. New Orleans neighborhood associations are creatively coercive about joining networks. When they have little power or are actively excluded from such networks, they seek levers from outside the policy system. These creative tools are their 'weapons of the weak' (Scott 1985) and allow them a voice in matters critical to their locale.
This reframes networks. No longer do networks serve only as partnerships to make policies more efficient. Instead, urban policy networks are the scene of community conflict made famous by Alinsky (1971) . Creativity is critical to these conflicts; excluded neighborhoods enact strategies to increase involvement and voice.
Literature Dahl (1961) famously asked 'Who Governs?' The use of the term governance has changed over time (Kooiman 1993) to include more actors in networks. The new governance literature highlights the roles of additional actors in policy networks. Network governance highlights the relationship between these new actors, particularly when they interact in informal, nonhierarchical ways (Sørenson & Torfing 2005) . Brown and Keast (2003) categorize the different types of relationships community groups within networks can have. These three core concepts (new governance, network governance, and relationship categories) set the stage for a more specific discussion of power and conflict with policy networks.
Scholars claim that increasingly, 'public policy is less of a governmental dictum and more of an ongoing negotiation among government and non-government actors (Katz & Mair, 1995; Castells, 1996; Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Ornstein and Mann, 2000; Bingham et al, 2005a; Blyth and Katz, 2005) ' (Crozier, 2008 p. 3) . While Crozier makes an empirical claim, other scholars soften the claim arguing, 'the idea of a sovereign state that governs society topdown through laws, rules and detailed regulations has lost its grip and is being replaced by new ideas about a decentred governance based on interdependence, negotiation and trust' (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005, pp. 195-196) . Kooiman (1993) argues that the term 'governance' entered the literature in the 1990s. Stoker (1998, p. 17) notes this shift and argues that it no longer only refers to what government does, but to a broader process. Stoker (1998) is not alone in noticing this shift in the understanding of governance. Forrest (2003, p. 593) argues that governance has moved from 'centrally steered' to being 'negotiated, multi-actor, interorganizational relations that link together state and society'. Bogason and Musso (2006, p. 4 ) describe this new term as referring to 'an analytic focus, emphasizing process rather than formal organization, with a gradual evolution to recognition of processes as networks'.
Scholars working within the new governance paradigm look to sharpen the analytical understanding of what occurs when more actors are involved in policy networks. Network governance is directly derived from new governance, but includes a more formal definition and contains a number of theoretical insights and tools that make it applicable to the urban context. In particular, network governance stipulates that relationships between actors in networks be non-hierarchical and that the policy process be a negotiation. Jones et al. (1997) define network governance as patterns of interactions in exchange and relations and flows of resources between independent units. These two basic concepts, independence and relationships, are common in definitions of network governance.
Network governance research spans multiple generations, from theoretical discussion, to examples of case studies, to understanding the democratic implications of non-hierarchical, negotiated networks (Torfing 2005) . This work pushes that boundary, by extending beyond single case studies to look at a cornucopia of different examples of relationships between neighborhood associations and other organizations (from non-profits to elected officials) in post-Katrina New Orleans.
Much of the discussion around community participation in network arrangements is contextualized by a need to decrease the costs of public services (see Rhodes 1996) . This is a core theme in network governance literature, where Rhodes explicitly describes governance as being about New Public Management and Stoker (1998, p. 39 ) calls governance, 'the acceptable face of spending cuts'. More recent research focuses on the benefits of using networks to provide social services (see Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004) . Brown and Keast (2003) take this discussion in another direction, shifting the focus away from efficiency and towards types of relationships.
One understanding of networks argues that they increase the efficiency of social services through market mechanisms such as competition; this is an extension of the logic of new public management (Rhodes, 1996) . But other scholars and politicians trumpet networks because of their collaborative power. In particular, Katz and Bradley's Metro Revolution (2013) Governing by Networks (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004) , arguing that the future of governance is in the management of local networks such as those that a city uses to provide its social services. Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 229) get to the heart of this line of thinking, claiming:
'The advantages of network coordination in both public and private sectors are considerable, including enhanced learning, more efficient use of resources, increased capacity to plan for and address complex problems, greater competitiveness, and better services for clients and customers'. Brown and Keast (2003) are a part of this second class of network theorists, who argue that working together provides new opportunities to improve efficiency. They classify relationships within these networks as the '3Cs'. 2 These categories are cooperation, coordination and collaboration. The categories are based upon differing levels of partnership.
Cooperation is the least formal of these configurations, featuring short, informal relationships (Hogue 1994; Cigler 2001; Lawson 2002) in which organizations share things such as information and space, but still have autonomy (Winer & Ray 1994; Cigler 2001; Mulford & Rogers 1982; Melavillee & Blank 1991) . Coordination is also short-term, but involves additional planning and coordination (Mulford & Rogers 1982; Daka-Mulwana 1995; Lawson 2002 , Litterer 1973 , Lawson 2002 . Finally, Brown and Keast (2003, p. 8) describe collaboration as 'the most stable and long term' relationship, with 'comprehensive planning and well-defined communication channels.'
The classification of the '3Cs' in terms of working together harbors an implicit assumption that network governance is a viable strategy because partnership leads to more efficient outcomes. But in doing so, Brown and Keast ignore the possibility of power struggle and conflict within policy networks. In the urban context, there is a long history of conflict as part 2 Brown and Keast narrow the five categories of relationships from "informal, cooperative, coordination, collaborative and integrative" (Hogue 1994; Cigler 2001; Leutz 1999; and Szirom et al. 2002) , and build upon the five companion 'c words' for integration used by Lawson (2002) : co-location, communication, coordination, collaboration and convergence. Brown and Keast (2003) use the more recent consensus that has emerged (see Winer & Ray 1994; Konrad 1996 and Fine 2001) around the use of 3Cs: cooperation, coordination and collaboration.
of the toolkit for progress. That can be through social movements (Anyon 2005), neighborhood conflict (Arnold 1979) , and community organizing (Alinsky 1971).
Each of these examples refers to communities using policy networks as a way to gain power.
In doing so, they reflect a movement in the philosophical understanding of power, from power of one person over another (Lukes 1974; Hunter 1969) to power of people (and organizations) over each other (Foucault 1978; Gaventa 2003) . In the latter philosophical approaches, people and organizations can be interdependent; power does not have to be complete and dominant. Those in positions of weakness can still exert power over those in positions of strength (and those in positions of strength can, of course, exert power back over the weak).
By discussing power in the context of urban policy networks, this study examines an aspect of the structure or agency debate (see Hayward & Lukes 2008) , in which sources of power are seen to be systematic or individualistic. In one corner of that debate, authors have specifically looked at how 'weapons of the weak' (Scott 1985) over time, fuel resistance to power structures, or the 'power of the powerless' (Havel et al. 1985) in which rejecting symbols has a similar effect. But that discussion has not reached the discussion of networks, where networks are seen not as sites of power struggles but as opportunities for partnership and efficiency gains.
This research provides a link between this philosophical arm of the study of power, the urban tradition of social movement, and community organizing. This research shows that neighborhoods in New Orleans not only find themselves in conflict over the construction and direction of networks, but also use specific strategies to address their power deficit.
Methodology
This research is part of a larger inquiry into the priorities and strategies of neighborhood billion in damages (Birkland, 2006) and over 1,000 deaths. Just days before, the city called for a full evacuation. At the time, it was the largest evacuation in the country's history.
Eighty percent of the city flooded after the storm, as New Orleans, a city shaped like a bowl, filled up with water, endangering the lives of those who stayed. New Orleans lost not just lives, but key infrastructure, leaving the city with a series of policy decisions and controversy over who should make those decisions. For residents struggling to find a way to return to the city, neighborhood associations were a key way to stay connected and attempt to have a voice in the city's recovery. Katrina, these organizations took on a variety of roles, some becoming watchdogs, some providing services to their residents, some engaging in fierce conflict with their elected officials or developers. In doing so, neighborhood associations became an ideal mechanism with which to study network governance. They clearly meet the theoretical criteria: they have no formal relationship with government or others in their networks, and they are an actor from outside the traditional sphere of government. New Orleans was forced to reexamine many of its public systems after the devastation of Hurricane Katrina; these neighborhood associations engaged in a wide range of activities in a wide range of networks, creating an almost unparalleled chance to study multiple cases of network governance.
Doing so is not easy. Neighborhood associations are notoriously difficult to contact;
information from city government indicated that neighborhood associations sometimes disappeared from the mayoral administration's eye only to reappear a decade later. As a result, this study uses a mixed methods approach to attempt to triangulate these associations, their activities and their motives. These methods include: ethnography, survey, document analysis and interviews.
The case for mixed methods research is rooted in both the difficulty of penetrating neighborhood-level processes and the tendency for non-profits to tailor their answers to their audience (Stablein 1996) . Using multiple methods expanded access to these associations. The Neighborhood Association was African-American, her association had only a few members.
She reached out to the Felicity Street Redevelopment Project Inc., whose volunteers came from the nearby Garden District and were almost all white. Oliver Thomas used that fact against her.
The neighborhood association lacked public support, money or legal influence. But it was not content to let the development of the grocery store continue. Working on a local tip, the association's members discovered that one of the properties in the development area was still on the market. The developers only thought they had purchased it. This often occurs in relatively poor, African-American neighborhoods in New Orleans. Properties stay in the family for generations and paperwork is rarely up to date. As a result, developers believed they owned all the necessary properties and were caught unawares. Armed with information about the true owners of the home, the preservationist Felicity Street Redevelopment Project
Inc. and the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association approached a second grocery store that was eager to spite the development as it had lost on its own bid to develop the grocery store.
The association elicited a six-figure donation from the grocery chain, then used that money to purchase the home. Under cover of darkness, and worried that the developer would discover their plot, they met with the homeowner and purchased the property.
The purchase slowed the development, and although it was eventually abandoned for other reasons, that purchase was considered to be a key moment in the policy process by interviewees from the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association and collaborative partner Felicity Street Redevelopment Project Inc. It also gave them a stake in a policy process from which the association was excluded, by leveraging resources considered by others to have been outside of the process. As the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association was excluded from the policy networks in its neighborhood, it grasped for another way to insert itself into the debate. It eventually took something extraneous, a donation from a rival developer and the purchase of a historic home affected, and used these things to insert itself into the policy network. This is what I call creative coercion.
The Algiers Point Association followed that same pattern in a conflict with Crescent City
Connection. The Algiers Point neighborhood is across the Mississippi River from the rest of New Orleans. Known as the West Bank, many of the neighborhood residents commute into the downtown for work. Poorer residents often use the free ferry to cross into the French Quarter, where the tourism industry thrives and where they work at a variety of restaurants and stores. After Hurricane Katrina, the ferry service was suspended, and later opened with limited hours. This was an area of concern for residents of Algiers Point, as they found themselves stuck in the French Quarter because shifts ended after the ferry had closed for the night. As a result, many found themselves paying for taxis to return to their families after work, an added expense they could not afford. Neighborhood association meetings dealing with the ferry saw spiked attendance, and the association started an organization called Again here, the neighborhood association, which was excluded from all meaningful aspects of a decision with quite a large impact on the neighborhood, found a creative way to insert itself into the policy negotiation. In this case, research and legal approaches complemented a broadly political strategy. Both were designed to give the association power at the negotiating table. The Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association received only minor concessions from Walgreens, but these included historically influenced designs as well as a shift in the back facade of the building so as not to screen out the neighborhood.
That was not the last time that the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association was a thorn in the side of a policy network that sought to exclude them. Another critical issue after the storm was demolitions and blight. Mayor Ray Nagin and his administration asserted emergency powers for demolitions. The immediate problem was that damaged houses were collapsing, and causing other houses damage. But secondary problems emerged. Rumors of perfectly good houses being demolished without due process ripped through neighborhoods.
The mayor was caught in a scandal with the New Orleans Affordable Housing (NOAH) in which houses were claimed to be demolished that did not exist.
The Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association featured two avid preservationists as its leadership. One started a blog that took pictures of thousands of homes so there would be a record if they were demolished without cause. She also worked on the NOAH story, helping expose the corruption behind the demolition process. The other leader, according to an interview with another neighbor, took even more extreme action. The president of the association was dismayed not only at the demolitions, but also at the lack of a response from her neighbors. So one night, she bought spray paint, and painted the demolition sign on a number of neighborhood houses. The result was immediate; now her neighbors were invested.
There were policy changes as a result of these creative and coercive measures. Emergency powers for demolitions were ended, and a board oversaw and approved demolitions. The leadership in the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association took an issue in which they were completely excluded, and had no formal authority, and inserted themselves into the discussion. These different examples of creative coercion all follow a pattern. A neighborhood association is excluded. That association lacks traditional power, financing or decisionmaking, so it searches for something outside the system. It then uses that creative, coercive technique to insert itself back into the process.
Conclusion
The exclusion of neighborhood association in New Orleans policy networks and their ensuing conflicts, points out the need to reconsider these networks. Theory on networks, particularly within the work of Brown and Keast (2003) Neighborhood associations, faced with exclusion, use creative and coercive measures to insert themselves into these networks.
The response to this exclusion by New Orleans' neighborhood associations fits within a broader debate on the agency and structure of power. Neighborhood associations are clearly disadvantaged by the structure around them; they have little in terms of resources or formal legislative clout. In this way, they have much in common with Scott's (1985) wielders of 'weapons of the weak' or those with Havel's 'power of the powerless' (Havel et al. 1985) . In both these situations, the challenge is to have a modicum of influence despite little structural power. Similarly, how-to guides to urban activism and community organizing, such as Alinsky's (1971) Rules for Radicals, provide a roadmap for asserting the same type of influence. Urban neighborhoods have long engaged in strategies to oppose development, fight for civil rights, or empower locals in politics.
While none of this is new or unique to New Orleans, it is new to the broader theories around networks and connection. Castells (1997, p. 425) So while the creative activity of neighborhood associations is not unique, it does make an important contribution to the understanding of networks. Specifically, these associations and their conflicts illuminate a model of how urban neighborhoods address their structural power deficit in the context of networks. The contribution is in the incorporation of these conflicts and strategies into an understanding of network formation and negotiation.
That model of how urban neighborhood associations work is called here, creative coercion. Cook (1972) coined the term, but this research both expands his concept and adds a strategic understanding to its use by grassroots and neighborhood organizations. While Cook sees coercion as morally neutral, he argues that coercion is creative when it is used for positive ends, often against the status quo. One example he gives is against racism in the South. Conrad (1974, p. 420) direction, but to a specific pattern of strategies used by those less powerful against authorities.
The research then catalogues the pattern of strategies used by neighborhood associations in New Orleans.
The form of creative coercion established in this study, in which less powerful entities, here neighborhood associations, challenge more powerful authorities, has several characteristics.
The first characteristic is that the neighborhood association is excluded from a network.
Sometimes this means the association is not a part of the network at all, and at other times the association remains in the network but does not have the influence to affect final decisions.
As discussed above, this is already a reconceptualization of networks as being the location of power struggles rather than primarily the location of partnership.
The second characteristic of the creative coercion model is that neighborhood associations are at a structural power deficit; they have little money or formal decision-making power. This leaves them unable to use traditional strategies to leverage a spot within the network, or to influence the network.
Finally, the third characteristic of the creative coercion model is that in response to this power deficit, neighborhood associations are forced to find and pull a lever from outside of the current policy debate to force others in the network to give them a seat at the table. While the nature of innovation, creativity, and unexpected action make it difficult to make broad generalizations what these levers are, there are a number of levers commonly used. First, creative levers are often found by a small group of volunteers rather than wide unified action, a sharp delineation from Castells' (2013) networks of outrage, which depend on greater numbers. Second, the creative action often involves the repurposing of a formal structure. For example, the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association repurposed an election to make it about a local development issue. The association also repurposed blighted buildings to promote their message (and physically, their signs) that 'Walgreens kills neighborhoods.'
Other neighborhoods repurpose structure in similar ways.
This creative coercion model draws from similar writing on community organizing tactics, but has a different purpose. Rather than provide a guide to community activists, it is an incorporation of power and agency theory into an understanding of networks.
Thus, this article makes two contributions to our understandings of networks. First, it moves beyond current theorizing that networks are primarily partnerships to be used to create more efficient government, to a conception of networks as the location of power struggles. The article also uses the conflicts of neighborhood associations to build the creative coercive model, which shows specifically how long-standing community organizing tools are used to battle exclusion from networks, and to garner power within them despite structural deficits of power. 
